Good Reasons and Natural Ends: Rosalind Hursthouse’s Hermeneutical Naturalism

Rosalind Hursthouse (∗1943) is known chiefly both for her groundbreaking work in applying virtue ethics to practical matters and for her 1999 monograph On Virtue Ethics, which represents one of the first and few systematic treatments of modern virtue ethics and, in its central doctrines, remains highly influential to this day. The third and final part of this book is devoted to what is now known as neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism, which in Hursthouse’s own words generally consists in “the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature” (192). On her account, this project specifically aims at rendering the rationality of virtuous action intelligible by situating it in the wider context of human life.

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Notes

Unless otherwise noted, all references are to Hursthouse (1999). Another comparably systematic development of modern virtue ethics, which appeared around the same time, is Müller (1998). For some of Hursthouse’s important contributions to applied ethics, cf. Hursthouse (1987, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2006, 2009, 2011).

Throughout this paper, I will use ‘practical thought’ and ‘ethical thought’ more or less interchangeably to refer to thought about what ought to be done.

This misunderstanding underlies a widespread line of criticism against neo-Aristotelian naturalism, which seeks to demonstrate that the traditional virtues are incompatible with, and therefore cannot be grounded in, a purely evolutionary or biological account of human beings. Cf. Andreou (2006), Millum (2006), and Millgram (2009). As will become apparent by the end of this paper, a similar misunderstanding also underlies Leist’s (2010, 136-141) charge that Hursthouse’s ‘biological’ naturalism fails due to its alleged reliance on an outdated vitalistic folk biology that has been refuted by post-Darwinian scientific biology.

Rehg and Davis (2003) argue that, since Hursthouse does not embrace a scientistic concept of nature, her virtue ethics cannot count as genuinely naturalistic either. Yet, if ‘naturalism’ merely means the attempt at providing an explanation, validation, or justification in terms of nature, then it leaves open which concept of nature to employ. It seems that, in principle, nothing precludes a normative concept of nature from doing this work. Rehg and Davis deny this by pointing out structural analogies between Hursthouse’s normative concept of human nature and a decidedly non-naturalistic Neo-Kantian concept of normativity. One may wonder, however, whether Rehg and Davis sufficiently heed the differences between these views and whether they do not, from the outset, formulate their criteria for a genuinely naturalistic concept of nature with scientism firmly in mind.

But note that critics such as Hare (1957), Pigden (1990), and Halbig (2015, 180–182) have questioned whether we do in fact employ ‘good’ consistently in a logically attributive manner. While I believe we do, on a proper understanding of logical attributiveness, I cannot argue the matter here for reasons of space.

Halbig (2015), 184–186, argues that the exclusion of health aspects from the overall evaluation of human beings represents a significant breach of continuity to other living beings, and that this seriously imperils the naturalistic character of ethical evaluation on Hursthouse’s account. It is important to note, however, that even among the other living beings there are significant differences regarding their aspects and natural ends. Clearly then, Hursthouse understands the continuity between the structures of evaluation that form part of different biological species concepts or natures not in terms of strict identity but rather in terms of family resemblance. Yet, speaking with McDowell, this allows for a ‘relaxed naturalism’ that is open to an essentially ethical form of evaluating living beings and a normative concept of human nature as essentially second nature.

Lott (2014) offers a systematic discussion of this objection as raised against neo-Aristotelian naturalism more generally.

A variant of the foundationalist picture also underlies Gowans’ (2008) charge that a “straightforward application of the Teleological Criterion” (52) allegedly formed by the four ends will not yield anything resembling our morality, and that in particular moral universalism cannot be derived from it. That is, Gowans treats the four ends as a criterion that we can apply to test ethical beliefs directly. Yet, this is not Hursthouse’s intent. Although the four ends are meant to guide ethical thought and argument somehow, they are not meant to effectively replace it with a quasi-technical decision procedure of this kind.

For ‘hinge propositions’, cf. Wittgenstein (1974), §§341–343, and Schönbaumsfeld (2016). In her attempt at uncovering the logical grammar of ethical thought, Hursthouse (208–211; 2004, 269–271) not only argues that the reasons of virtue in fact reflect these four ends, but also that other ethical theories contain traces of them. In line with Wittgenstein’s therapeutic conception of philosophy, these theories are thereby shown to be one-sided or otherwise defective explications of our actual practice, which ultimately threaten to corrupt it.

Cf. Hacker-Wright (2013) for a similar interpretation of the four ends. For a critical perspective, cf. Brüllmann (2013).

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Authors and Affiliations

1. University of Trier, Trier, Germany Sascha Settegast

1. Sascha Settegast